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Abstract  
 
In recent scholarship, moral theologians and readers of Thomas Aquinas have shown increasing 
sensitivity to the role of the passions in the moral life. Yet these accounts have paid inadequate 
attention to Thomas’s writings on Christ’s passions as a source of moral reflection. As I argue in 
this essay, Thomas’s writings on Christ’s human affectivity should not be limited to the concerns 
of Christology; rather, they should be integrated into a fuller account of the human passions. One 
upshot of this approach for Thomists is that it sharpens our vocabulary when describing human 
nature and the conditions for the moral life. By considering the rubrics of creation, fall, and 
redemption – as Thomas does – we find that our resources for analyzing the passions are greatly 
enriched.   
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Introduction 
Thomas Aquinas’s account of the passions has enjoyed a resurgence in recent scholarship, but 
surprisingly little attention has been given to the ways in which this account might intersect with 
other areas of his thought. This essay examines Thomas’s theology of Christ’s passions in 
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Question 15 of the Tertia Pars of the Summa Theologiae1 in comparison with his treatment of 
Adam’s nature in the state of innocence in Question 95 of the Prima Pars. I argue that Thomas’s 
account of the passions (and by implication, his theological anthropology on the whole) cannot 
be understood apart from the economy of salvation. That is, since Christ’s human affectivity 
illustrates most perfectly the proper relationship between the passions and the higher aspects of 
the soul, the Christological concerns in STh III, q. 15 are not simply an application of Thomas’s 
theory of the passions to the case of Christ, but rather they present the culmination of Thomas’s 
analysis of human passions and therefore should be considered a central text not only in 
Thomas’s Christology, but in his anthropology and moral theology. 
It is by comparing the passions of the soul in the ‘First Adam’ and ‘Second Adam’ (1 
Cor. 15:45) that we see most clearly how Christ is the exemplar of virtue and the eschatological 
image of the viator et comprehensor. Christ’s humanity was a true humanity; it was not 
humanity in the precise mode as that of our first parents, nor in that of ourselves in the present 
state, but it was the fullness of humanity. In his treatment of Christ’s assumed defects, for 
example, many of Thomas’s arguments and responses to objections rely on the premise that 
Christ must have been entirely without sin in order for to effect our salvation. His analysis of 
Christ’s animal passions reveals that, far more than just providing a defense of Christ’s 
sinlessness, Christ’s humanity provides the perfect icon of moral perfection and holiness. 
Christ’s humanity and, by extension, his passions were different from Adam’s, and this is 
because the humanity that needed to be redeemed was in a different state than Adam’s, and 
therefore Christ took on certain defects that did not belong to Adam. Yet, Christ’s humanity was 
different from ours because, in order for his Incarnation to be salvific, his humanity must have 
                                                
1 Citations of the Summa in this essay are taken from Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 8 Vols (Latin and 
English), ed. John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred 
Doctrine, 2012). 
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been devoid of certain defects that were opposed to the perfection of virtue. This is the guiding 
principle for determining which defects Christ’s humanity did or did not have: those ordered 
toward the salvation of the human race were assumed by Christ; those that were not ordered to 
this end (or opposed to it) were not assumed. Moreover, there are even stronger implications 
beyond the claim that Christ’s humanity was a true humanity or the claim that his humanity was 
instrumental in our salvation. Thomas is concerned to make the point that, given what we can 
learn about the passions of Christ’s soul, we can better follow and conform to him as the 
exemplar of virtue, and, furthermore, we acquire a deeper understanding of the end of virtue as it 
leads to beatitude.   
 
1. Thomas’s Account of the Passions 
 
It is worth mentioning from the outset that Thomas’s Treatise on the Passions (STh I-II, qq. 22-
48) is longer than any other treatise within the Summa Theologiae.2 It contains more questions 
(and more text overall) than any of his better-known treatises on the Trinity, grace, habits, and 
law. Furthermore, it represents the most extensive treatment of the topic during the medieval era. 
Until relatively recently, philosophers and theologians have for the most part neglected this area 
of Thomas’s thought. As interest in the topic has revived, scholars have begun to appreciate the 
                                                
2 My overview of Thomas on the passions relies primarily on his mature teaching found in the Summa. While 
Thomas does treat the passions in De Veritate and other works, he is much less systematic in those instances. Mark 
Jordan offers an insightful analysis of the structure and genre of Thomas’s account of the passions (primarily as 
found in the Sentences commentary, the Summa, and De Veritate) in his essay “Aquinas’s Construction of a Moral 
Account of the Passions,” in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, Vol. 33 (1986): 71-97. While I 
disagree with Jordan’s claim that for Thomas the moral life is wholly contemplative, I agree with his assessment, 
“Indeed, it may be that the shape of the Summa’s treatment of moral matters is the most eloquent – and the most 
pointed – argument for the teleology that makes possible a reasonable control over the passions” (97). 
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importance of this topic not only as it relates to the rest of Thomas’s thought, but also as a 
significant contribution to contemporary debates surrounding the psychology of the emotions.3  
For Thomas, a passion is simply a movement of the sensitive appetite.4 Although 
passions are movements of the soul (insofar as they involve conscious perception), they also 
involve some kind of bodily modification.5 In and of themselves, passions are morally neutral; 
they are always inclined toward or away from some particular, immediate thing, and the object 
of the inclination is the measure of the passion’s moral value.6 In Augustine’s words, “They are 
evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good.”7 Because they originate in the sensitive appetite, 
they are counted among the “pre-rational” aspects of human nature, and, indeed, they represent a 
shared feature of all animal life. The important difference, according to Thomas, is that human 
                                                
3 Three important monographs on Aquinas’s account of the passions have been released within the last few years, 
roughly around the same time. As a result, none of these authors interacts with the others, and there is quite a bit of 
overlap among the three books. Each has a particular angle and focus, however. Diana Fritz Cates, Aquinas on the 
Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009) is especially 
interested in Thomas’s account with an eye toward contemporary concerns and as a contribution toward constructing 
a general account of the emotions. Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011) writes his analysis in conversation with 
contemporary analytic philosophy, and his text is unique in that it contains an entire chapter on the passions of 
Christ’s soul (which draws heavily from Gondreau; see below). Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A 
Study of Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae 22-48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) is the most 
straightforwardly exegetical; it is narrowly focused on the treatise on the passions in the Summa, but it is quite 
thorough and contains helpful tables and figures that illuminate complex aspects of Thomas’s account.   
4 In STh I-II, q. 22, a. 3 sc, Thomas affirms the definition given by John of Damascus: “Sed contra est quod dicit 
Damascenus, in II libro, describens animales passiones, passio est motus appetitivae virtutis sensibilis in 
imaginatione boni vel mali. Et aliter, passio est motus irrationalis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali.” Miner 
observes that Thomas could have easily given an Aristotelian definition, but chose not to. He suggests that Thomas 
intentionally chose the Damascene’s incomplete definition for pedagogical reasons: “Rather than provide a complete 
definition of passion at the beginning, Aquinas employs a more subtle strategy. He desires that the reader should sift 
through the proposals of a range of auctoritates – Aristotle, Cicero, Damascene, Nemesius, and Augustine among 
them – so that she might arrive at a conception that includes elements of the integral tradition,” Thomas Aquinas on 
the Passions, 31.  
5 STh I-II, q. 22, a. 3: “[P]assio proprie invenitur ubi est transmutation corporalis.” 
6 STh I-II, q. 24, a. 4 ad 2: “[P]assiones quae in bonum tendunt, si sit verum bonum, sunt bonae, et similiter quae a 
vero malo recedunt. E converso vero passiones quae sunt per recessum a bono, et per accessum ad malum, sunt 
malae.” 
7 Thomas cites this statement (from De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) in STh I-II, q. 24, a. 1 sc.  
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passions are (or at least can be) subject to the command of will and reason.8 As Kevin White 
observes, “With likeness to both, passions are motions situated ‘between’ spiritual and bodily 
motions.”9 Thus, the passions stand at the crux of Thomas’s anthropology, and they underscore 
the Aristotelian notion that the human being is a rational animal.10  
Thomas’s structure of the Treatise on the Passions roughly follows the division of the 
sensitive soul into the concupiscible and irascible appetites. He explains this basic twofold 
division thusly, 
[T]he object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply 
apprehended as such, which causes pleasure [delectabile] or pain [dolorosum]. 
But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in 
acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, insofar as such good or 
evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very 
good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the 
irascible faculty.11  
 
The result of this division is that certain passions pertain to good or bad absolutely and 
immediately (joy, sorrow, love, hatred, etc.), and these belong to the concupiscible appetite; 
other passions pertain to good or bad through difficulty (daring, fear, hope, etc.), and these 
belong to the irascible appetite.12 The passions can also be grouped as pairs of contraries. The 
first type of contrary regards the goodness or badness of the objects to which the passions are 
responding. Thus, in the concupiscible appetite, the passions of love, desire, and joy incline 
toward the good, whereas the passions of hatred, aversion, and sorrow tend away from evil; in 
                                                
8 STh I-II, q. 24, a. 1: “Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate 
non prohibentur.” STh I-II, q. 24, a. 1 ad 1: “[I]stae passiones secundum se consideratae, sunt communes hominibus 
et aliis animalibus, sed secundum quod a ratione imperantur, sunt propriae hominum.” 
9 Kevin White, “The Passions of the Soul (Ia IIae, qq. 22-48),” in The Ethics of Aquinas, Ed. Stephen J. Pope 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 103. White’s article offers perhaps the best brief overview 
of Thomas’s account of the passions. It is especially good in highlighting Thomas’s use of metaphorical language to 
describe the passions as movements of sensitive appetite. 
10 STh I, q. 79, a. 8 ad 3. For an insightful essay on the ways in which Thomas’s account of the passions provides a 
remedy to the problems inherent in contemporary debates about human nature, see Reinhard Hütter, “Body Politics 
beyond Angelism and Animalism: The Human Passions and Their Irreducible Spiritual Dimension,” in Dust Bound 
for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 75-101. 
11 STh I-II, q. 23, a. 1. 
12 Ibid. 
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the irascible appetite, the passions of hope and daring incline toward the good, whereas the 
passions of despair and fear tend away from evil.13 Due to the nature of the irascible appetite, the 
passions that belong to it may also be classified in a second type of contrary: approach and 
withdrawal in respect to the same object. As Thomas explains, “[T]he object of the irascible 
faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty or 
arduousness.”14 So, for example, if a person is motivated to pursue an object through hope 
(imagine, for example, a man stranded in the desert who sees a body of water in the distance), it 
is possible that same object, if it is perceived as too difficult to obtain, will then become a source 
of despair.15 Thus, the divisions of the concupiscible and irascible appetites, as well as the 
theoretical divisions of contraries, set the basic framework for Thomas’s structuring of the 
passions. 
 The result of this framework is a definitive classification of eleven passions. These 
include love (amor), hatred (odium), desire (desiderium or concupiscentia), aversion (fuga or 
abominatio), joy (gaudium or delectatio), sadness (dolor or tristitia) hope (spes), despair 
(desperatio), fear (timor), daring (audacia), and anger (ira).16 This list reflects Thomas’s mature 
teaching on the passions, and it also unique to him among the various scholastic classifications.17 
Furthermore, just as the virtues are reducible to four cardinal virtues,18 Thomas holds that these 
                                                
13 STh I-II, q. 23, a. 2. The passion of anger does not fall within this schema since it does not have a contrary (STh I-
II, q. 23, a. 3: “Unde motus irae non potest habere aliquem motum animae contrarium, sed solummodo opponitur ei 
cessatio a motu, sicut philosophus dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod mitescere opponitur ei quod est irasci, quod non est 
oppositum contrarie, sed negative vel privative.”). Moreover, anger finds its source in the passion of daring (STh I-
II, q. 25, a. 4 ad 3).  
14 STh I-II, q. 23, a. 2.  
15 Miner provides a helpful and very thorough analysis of the movements of the passions in Ch. 3, “The activation of 
passion,” in Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 58-87.  
16 STh I-II, q. 23, a. 4.  
17 See Paul Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Chicago, IL: University 
of Scranton Press, 2009), 102-107.  
18 STh I-II, q. 61, a. 2 
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eleven passions may be reduced to four “principle” passions: joy, sadness, hope, and fear.19 The 
logic behind this is that each of these somehow completes the other passions, either in relation to 
the present or in relation to the future.20 Thus, passions either find their ultimate rest in joy or 
sadness (in the present), or they culminate in a movement that is oriented toward hope or fear (in 
the future). For example, Thomas explains, “[I]n respect of good, movement begins in love, goes 
forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to 
aversion, and ends in fear.”21 Simply stated, these principal passions most clearly reflect the 
tendency of the sensitive appetite, as a basic feature of our animal nature, to incline toward or 
away from some particular thing.22 
 Another vitally important feature of the passions is their inherent relation to moral 
development.23 For Thomas, the passions are the subjects of the moral virtues insofar as the 
virtues reflect a harmony of the passions in relation to reason and will.24 Unlike the Stoics, 
Thomas asserts that the right ordering of the passions – not their suppression or elimination – is 
constitutive of the moral life.25 While there are other important components of Thomas’s moral 
                                                
19 STh I-II, q. 25, a. 4. 
20 Ibid.: “Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numerus accipi secundum differentiam praesentis et futuri, motus 
enim respicit futurum, sed quies est in aliquo praesenti. De bono igitur praesenti est gaudium; de malo praesenti est 
tristitia; de bono vero futuro est spes; de malo futuro est timor.” 
21 Ibid.: “[R]espectu boni, incipit motus in amore, et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe; respectu vero mali, 
incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in timore.” 
22 Alexander Brungs aptly summarizes the logic behind the principal passions: “Das, was eine Regung des 
sinnengebundenen Strebevermögens also zu einer grundlegenden Regung macht, ist ihr in Relation zu den anderen 
Affekten zielhafter, vervollständigender, mithin abschließender Charakter,” in Metaphysik der Sinnlichkeit: Das 
System der Passiones Animae bei Thomas von Aquin (Hallescher Verlag: Akademische Studien Vorträge, Nr. 6, 
2002), 103.  
23 See Cates, Aquinas on the Emotions, 213-240; Paul Gondreau, “Passions and the Moral Life: Appreciating the 
Originality of Aquinas,” in The Thomist 71 (2007): 419-50; Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 148-200; Miner, 
Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 88-108; and Servais Pinckaers, “Reappropriating Aquinas’s Account of the 
Passions,” in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and Craig Steven 
Titus (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 273-287.  
24 STh I-II, q. 56, a. 4. 
25 STh I-II, q. 59, a. 5: “[S]i passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut Stoici posuerunt; sic manifestum est 
quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est 
quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt.” 
 8 
theology – namely, the fruits, beatitudes, and gifts26 of the Holy Spirit, as well as the operation of 
grace, generally27 – the virtues and, by extension, the passions play a central role in his moral 
analysis. Thomas states that some passions are good or evil according to their species28 and, 
furthermore, that the irascible and concupiscible powers of the soul can be subjects of virtue,29 
and a fortiori, that moral virtue cannot exist without the passions.30 In short, “The moral 
significance of all passions,” as White explains, “is due to their capacity to attract, command, or 
absorb the soul’s attention.”31 Growth in virtue involves the ordering of the passions such that 
the soul’s attention is given over to that which is truly good.   
Moreover, for the purposes of this paper, an important feature of Thomas’s understanding 
of the nature of morality must be noted: for Thomas, morality is not merely concerned with 
“duty” or “obligation.” The final end of morality is beatitude; thus, the passions participate in the 
human person’s journey (i.e. as viator) toward beatitude.32 It should also be noted that Thomas’s 
treatise on the passions is a meant to contribute, first and foremost, to a conception of human 
nature per se; he does not situate his discussion of the passions within any one specific state or 
condition in which humanity might find itself. Although he does include in the treatise those 
passions that were absent in the state of innocence, this suggests that his intention was to treat the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Brungs offers a helpful overview of Thomas’s engagement with the Stoics’ understanding of the passions in 
Metaphysik der Sinnlichkeit, 84-102. 
26 STh I-II, qq. 68, 69, and 70, respectively. 
27 STh I-II.109-114. 
28 STh I-II, q. 24, a. 4. 
29 STh I-II, q. 56, a. 4. 
30 STh I-II, q. 59, a. 5. Thomas’s insistence on this point is not merely based on presuppositions about morality; it 
also reflects his understanding of the underlying metaphysical biology of the human person, including the 
relationship between body and soul, intellect and appetite. Anton Pegis, in his classic essay “St. Thomas and the 
Unity of Man,” highlights this connection in Thomas’s thought: “If all the powers of man are rooted in the soul; if, 
furthermore, one and the same intellectual soul has within its nature bot intellectual and sensible powers, this fact 
must mean, not that the soul has more powers than the intellect, but that the human intellect is not fully an intellect 
without sensible powers,” in Progress in Philosophy: Philosophical Studies in Honor of Rev. Doctor Charles A. 
Hart, ed. James A. McWilliams, S.J. (Milwaukee, WI: Bruce Publishing Co., 1955), 169. 
31 White, “The Passions of the Soul,” 111. 
32 STh I-II, q. 69, a. 2: “Cum enim aliquis incipit proficere in actibus virtutum et donorum, potest sperari de eo quod 
perveniet et ad perfectionem viae, et ad perfectionem patriae” (emphasis mine).  
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broadest possible range of human affectivity. In order to gain an understanding of how differing 
states of humanity are determinate for which passions will be present in the human person, one 
must look outside the treatise on the passions. 
 
2. Humanity Created: Adam, the State of Innocence, and the Fall from Grace 
 
Given Thomas’s analysis of the passions in the Prima Secundae, one might be inclined to 
suppose that he is describing a “default” mode of human existence, i.e. humanity as it existed 
from the moment of its creation. Yet, to find Thomas’s explicit views on the primitive state, one 
must turn to the treatise on man in the Prima Pars.33 There we find that Thomas’s 
characterization of primitive humanity (Adam, the first man) diverges in significant respects 
from the humanity that is under analysis in the Second Part of the Summa. Thomas holds that 
Adam’s humanity differed from ours in respect to mortality,34 bodily passibility,35 affectivity,36 
virtue,37 knowledge,38 and external environment.39 Attention to these differences will illuminate 
important insights of Thomas’s theological anthropology, and, as we shall see later when 
compared to the humanity of Christ, they also reveal insights of his Christology and moral 
theology.  
 Following the biblical narrative in Genesis 1-3, Thomas maintains that Adam would not 
have died had he not eaten from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But this does not 
mean that Adam was created as “naturally” immortal. Rather, Thomas explains, the first man 
possessed a material body just like ours, and matter is prone to decay. Adam’s immortality, then, 
                                                
33 STh I, qq. 75-102. 
34 STh I, q. 97, a. 1. 
35 STh I, q. 97, a. 2. 
36 STh I, q. 95, a. 2. 
37 STh I, q. 95, a. 3. 
38 STh I, q. 94, a. 3. 
39 STh I, q. 95, a. 2. 
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originated not in some intrinsic principle of his humanity, but in the direct power of God. “For 
man’s body,” he explains, “was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, 
but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to 
preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God.”40 Similarly, 
Adam’s body was impassible and thus immune from injury or corruption. This was the case 
partly due to God’s active preservation, but also due to Adam’s ability to avoid harm through the 
use of reason.41 Thus, while Adam’s body had the same physical nature as ours, it was 
nevertheless incorruptible and impassible while he dwelled in paradise and would have remained 
so had he not sinned.  
Another important difference is that Adam’s external environment did not necessitate the 
same passions that exist in postlapsarian humanity. Thomas bases this on his reading of Romans 
5:12 (“By sin death came into the world”), such that the Fall not only effected an internal 
disordering of human desire, but also an alteration of the external world itself. God’s 
preservation of Adam – the source of his incorruptibility and impassibility – was removed, and 
he now faced physical dangers that had been unknown before. Before the Fall, however, he did 
not possess the passions that pertained to present or immanent evil, or to a good not possessed. 
Thus, while he potentially possessed the full range of human passions, the movements of his 
sensitive appetite (and, thereby, the range of passions actually expressed) were different from 
                                                
40 STh I, q. 97, a. 1: “Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentem; 
sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione 
praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset.” In this article, Thomas describes three different types of 
incorruptibility. The first is that of matter that is “in potentiality to one form only,” such as the heavenly bodies. The 
second is the “incorruptibility of glory,” which stems from the soul’s (as the form of the body) beatification, as the 
soul’s incorruptibility “redounds” to the body itself (Thomas cites an obscure passage from Augustine to support 
this claim). As Thomas will describe later in the Summa, this bodily incorruptibility that stems from the redounding 
of glory is found in Christ’s post-resurrection body (STh III, q. 54, a. 2 ad 2, inter alia). The third kind is that 
brought about by efficient cause, and this is the relevant type of incorruptibility that describes Adam’s body. See 
also STh I, a. 97, a. 4 on the tree of life as the cause of Adam’s immortality.    
41 STh I-II, q. 97, a. 2 ad 4: “[C]orpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat praeservari ne pateretur laesionem ab 
aliquo duro, partim quidem per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam per divinam 
providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur. 
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ours as necessitated by a different environment – namely, an environment devoid of sin and 
death.42 
As a result of Adam existing in paradise (as opposed to the postlapsarian world), the list 
of passions belonging to him is truncated. This does not imply that he was anything less than 
fully human; it simply reflects the fact that there were things absent in Adam’s surroundings that 
would have activated certain passions. Thomas writes,  
And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was 
any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says 
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such 
as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not 
possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence.43 
 
Adam did, of course, possess the passions of joy, love, desire, and hope, as these pertain to either 
a future or present good. Nevertheless, Thomas offers the qualification that these passions 
existed “otherwise” than they exist in present humanity. This is because in present humanity (as 
a result of the punishment of original sin) the passions are not entirely subject to reason. “But in 
the state of innocence,” he explains, “the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in 
that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.”44 
Thus, Adam exhibited four of the eleven passions (or, two of the four principal passions), and 
these existed in a state of perfect harmony with his reason. 
                                                
42 I use the word “potentially” for lack of a better term. Thomas reserves the word “habitually” for the virtues (not 
the passions themselves), since virtues are habits, whereas passions are movements of the sensitive appetite. The 
point is that, had pre-fallen Adam been placed in an environment like ours, this would have “activated” the passions 
that had previously been hidden (See STh I, q. 95, a. 3 ad 2), and we can infer that Thomas believes this to be what 
did, in fact, happen when Adam was removed from the state of original justice. 
43 STh I, q. 95, a. 2: “Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat; nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod 
cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Civ. Dei, omnes illae passiones 
quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant ut timor et dolor et huiusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae 
respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans.” 
44 Ibid.: “In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo passiones 
animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes.” 
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 Furthermore, given that Adam possessed some passions and that those passions belong to 
the sensitive appetite, combined with the fact that he was created in the state of grace,45 Thomas 
concludes that Adam possessed all of the virtues.46 The only qualification he offers is that certain 
virtues involve a kind of imperfection that is incompatible with the primitive state, in which case 
Adam did not possess such virtues. These would include virtues such as penance and mercy, 
which imply the activation of passions such as sorrow, which, as we have seen, did not belong to 
Adam, since they were incompatible with the perfection of paradise. Yet, there are two senses in 
which it can be affirmed that Adam possessed the fullness of the virtues. The first is simply to 
acknowledge, as Thomas does, that Adam possessed all virtues at least in the form of habit, if 
not in act.47 In other words, if his environment had called for actions stemming from such 
virtues, Adam would have acted upon them. The other sense in which it is correct to attribute all 
virtues to Adam is to affirm that he possessed, both in habit and in act, all of the cardinal virtues 
(justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude) as well as the theological virtues (faith, hope, and 
charity). Some of these virtues do not imply any sort of imperfection (e.g. charity and justice), 
while some do imply an imperfection, yet in a mode that is compatible with the primitive state 
(e.g. faith and hope). Thomas writes, “For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision 
of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence 
faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act.”48 Adam even 
                                                
45 STh I, q. 95, a. 1. 
46 STh I, q. 95, a. 3: “[H]omo in statu innocentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes.” 
47 Ibid.: “Unde huiusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum.” 
48 Ibid.: “Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc, ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut haberet eum 
cum fruitione finalis beatitudinis, unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum 
ad actum.” 
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possessed the moral virtues, since these moderate not only “negative” passions such as sorrow or 
fear (which were absent in Adam), but also “positive” passions such as joy and hope.49  
 Humanity’s fall from grace through Adam’s sin constituted a monumental change in the 
functions human affectivity. In the primitive state, through a supernatural endowment of grace, 
the body was subject to the soul, and the lower powers of the soul (i.e. passions) were subject to 
the higher powers (i.e. reason).50 This supernatural endowment was lost, however, with the first 
sin. Thomas cites Augustine’s narration of this event: “Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 
13) that, as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were 
ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it 
were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience.”51 Thus, the disordering of the 
passions in relation to reason falls within the scope of divine providence, since it reflects the just 
sentence of God that grace was removed. Thomas goes on to explain, “Hence if the loss of grace 
dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were 
subjected to the soul through grace existing therein.”52 Yet grace was lost, and thus the harmony 
between flesh and soul was ruptured. 
According to Thomas, a consequence of the Fall is that the fomes peccati (“spark” of sin) 
has been inscribed in the human condition. Thus, no matter how much progress an individual 
                                                
49 STh I, q. 95, a. 3 ad 2: “Unde poterat esse in primo statu actus temperantiae, secundum quod est moderativa 
delectationum; et similiter fortitudo, secundum quod est moderativa audaciae sive spei; non autem secundum quod 
moderantur tristitiam et timorem.” 
50 It is worth noting that Thomas’s position on grace in the primitive state does not necessarily reflect a scholastic 
consensus. For example, Peter Lombard’s own position on the subject was unclear, and Thomas acknowledges the 
existence of conflicting opinions in STh I, q. 95, a. 1 ad 4. See also De Malo, q. 5, a. 1 ad 13: “quia cum originalis 
iustitia primordialiter consistat in subiectione humanae mentis ad Deum, quae firma esse non potest nisi per gratiam, 
iustitia originalis sine gratia esse non potuit. Et ideo habenti originalem iustitiam debebatur visio divina.” Citations 
from De Malo are taken from The De Malo of Thomas Aquinas (Latin and English), trans. Richard Regan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
51 STh I, q. 95, a. 1: “Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quod posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, 
confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, senserunt enim motum inobedientis 
carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae.”  
52 Ibid.: “Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in anima 
existentem inferiora ei subdebantur.” See also De Malo, q. 5, a. 1. 
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makes in achieving virtue (even to the point of achieving general stability between one’s reason 
and one’s passions), the “spark” of sin is always present as a threat to the operation of reason. 
The pervasive influence of this doctrine in Thomas’s theology can be seen in his frequent use of 
Rom. 7:23, “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and 
captivating me in the law of sin [lege peccati].” He equates this law with concupiscence itself: 
“Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which [Paul] had been speaking 
previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws reason counter 
to its knowledge.”53 Yet, for Thomas, “[S]in does not belong to human nature, whereof God is 
the cause; but rather has been sown in it against its nature by the devil.”54 God has created 
human beings with certain passions, but concupiscence is not one of them.55  
In his commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, Thomas elaborates on the Pauline 
conception of the fomes peccati as it relates the varying stages of humanity. “This law,” he 
writes, “is found in the sensitive appetite as in its source, but it is found spread over all the 
members which play a role for concupiscent desire in sinning.”56 He observes that this law has 
two effects in the person: it resists reason, and it makes the person a slave (hominem in 
servitutem).57 But this second effect does not obtain equally in all persons in whom it resides. For 
those who have received the healing that comes from grace, the fomes of sin, while still present, 
does not rule in the person to the extent that it compels consent and action. In Thomas’s terms, 
                                                
53 STh I-II, q. 77, a. 2 sc: “Lex autem quae est in membris, est concupiscentia, de qua supra locutus fuerat. Cum 
igitur concupiscentia sit passio quaedam, videtur quod passio trahat rationem etiam contra hoc quod scit.” 
54 STh III, q. 5, a. 1: “[P]eccatum non pertinet ad humanam naturam, cuius Deus est causa; sed magis est contra 
naturam per seminationem Diaboli introductum.” 
55 Concupiscence here refers to the disordered concupiscence resulting from original sin, not to the passion 
concupiscentia. Thomas clarifies this distinction in STh I-II, q. 82, a. 3 ad 1. 
56 Ad Rom. 7:23, lect. 4 (§ 588): “Haec autem lex originaliter quidem consistit in appetite sensitivo, sed diffusive 
invenitur in omnibus membris, quae deserviunt concupiscentiae ad pecandum.” Citations of Thomas’s Romans 
commentary are from Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans (Latin and English), 
trans. F. R. Larcher, O.P., ed. J. Mortensen and E. Alarcón (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of 
Sacred Doctrine, 2012).  
57 Ibid. 
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“[T]he law of sin makes man captive in two ways: the sinner it makes captive through consent 
and action; the man in grace through the movement of concupiscent desire.”58 For Thomas, to 
interpret the fomes of sin as a law depends not only on a conception of human nature per se, but 
on an account of the precise human state that is under consideration. Adam represents one such 
state (i.e. original justice); all those living after Adam constitute present humanity, yet within this 
category there exist those who are in a state of grace – the fomes applies to all, but in different 
ways. Furthermore, Thomas asserts that Jesus is the only human being who ever lived who did 
not possess the fomes of sin; the fact he did not inherit original sin meant that he was not subject 
to this “law.”59 In order to understand the significance of this claim, we must turn to a more 
detailed consideration of Christ’s humanity. 
 
3. The Humanity of Christ: The Passions of the Second Adam 
 
At the very beginning of his treatise on the Incarnation, Thomas offers numerous reasons that the 
second person of the Trinity, the divine Word, became incarnate. In addition to the general 
“fittingness” (convenientia) of the Incarnation as an expression of God’s goodness 
communicating itself to others,60 Thomas provides several considerations of what the Incarnation 
accomplished on humanity’s behalf. The first set of considerations falls under the heading of 
“our furtherance in good.”61 He demonstrates how the Incarnation stirs up and increases our 
faith, hope, and charity, as well as provides a real, human example of right living (rectam 
operationem) and a means of participating in God’s own divinity, “which is the true bliss of man 
                                                
58 Ibid.: “Lex autem peccati captivat hominem dupliciter. Uno modo hominem peccatorem per consensum et 
operationem; alio modo hominem sub gratia constitutum quantum ad concupiscentiae motum.”  
59 STh III, q. 15, a. 2. 
60 STh III, q. 1, a. 1: “Unde ad rationem summi boni pertinet quod summo modo se creaturae communicet. Quod 
quidem maxime fit per hoc quod naturam creatam sic sibi coniungit ut una persona fiat ex tribus, verbo, anima et 
carne, sicut dicit Augustinus, XIII de Trin. Unde manifestum est quod conveniens fuit Deum incarnari.” 
61 STh III, q. 1, a. 2. 
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and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ’s humanity.”62 Moreover, the 
Incarnation was useful (utile) for our withdrawal from evil, not least in accomplishing 
satisfaction for human sin and providing the healing effects of grace. It is in this respect that St. 
Paul refers to Christ as a second Adam, “For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be 
made alive” (1 Cor. 15:22, RSV). 
Thomas’s is a single-subject Christology, in which the Word assumes human nature in 
the one person of Jesus Christ, the God-man. Thomas’s mode of understanding this union is that 
Christ’s humanity is the personal, conjoined, animate instrument of his divinity.63 This humanity 
is not merely human “flesh,” but includes a fully human body and soul, including the lower, 
appetitive powers of the soul. In the Summa contra Gentiles, he provides the analogy of a hand 
as an instrument of the soul; when one uses a tool, such as an axe, this is not a direct instrument 
of the soul, but rather an external and common instrument. The hand, as instrument, is united to 
the soul in a way that the axe is not. Thomas explains that Christ’s humanity (in its entirety) was 
an instrument in a similar way: 
But the human nature in Christ is assumed with the result that instrumentally He 
performs the things which are the proper operation of God alone: to wash away 
sins, for example, to enlighten minds by grace, to lead into the perfection of 
eternal life. The human nature of Christ, then, is compared to God as a proper and 
conjoined instrument is compared, as the hand is compared to the soul.64 
 
                                                
62 Ibid.: “quantum ad plenam participationem divinitatis, quae vere est hominis beatitudo, et finis humanae vitae. Et 
hoc collatum est nobis per Christi humanitatem, dicit enim Augustinus, in quodam sermone de Nativ. domini, factus 
est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus.” 
63 See STh III, q. 2, a. 6.  
64 ScG IV, c. 41: “Sed humana natura in Christo assumpta est ut instrumentaliter operetur ea quae sunt operationes 
propriae solius Dei, sicut est mundare peccata, illuminare mentes per gratiam, et introducere in perfectionem vitae 
aeternae. Comparatur igitur humana natura Christi ad Deum sicut instrumentum proprium et coniunctum, ut manus 
ad animam.” Citations of the ScG are from Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book IV: Salvation, trans. 
Charles J. O’Neil (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975). The Latin text is from the Leonine 
edition, which can be found at: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org. 
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Thus, Christ, as man, is able to work and perform those things that belong exclusively to the 
power of God; the Word, as God, is acting through the instrument of his humanity, which he 
assumed in the Incarnation. 
In order to make sense of such claims as “Christ assumed human nature,” or “Christ’s 
humanity was the instrument of his divinity,” one must have some prior account of what 
constitutes humanity in and of itself. Not only that, but one must understand which condition or 
state of humanity is reflected in that which Christ assumed. Marilyn McCord Adams succinctly 
frames the question thusly: 
What sort of human nature did Christ assume? One like Adam’s and Eve’s before 
the fatal apple? One fallen and ungraced like murderous Cain’s? A human nature 
such as ours, fallen but helped by grace? A human nature already glorified – 
impassible, immortal, capable of walking through doors or ascending through 
uneven heavens? If each of these states is compatible with as well as accidental to 
human nature, Christ could be fully human in any one of them.65 
 
Thomas is well aware that this question must be answered, and he devotes much space in the 
Tertia Pars and elsewhere to answering it. One of the ways he approaches this question is by 
considering the various “defects” that Christ assumed in human nature. These defects are 
particular features of humanity (considered within the full spectrum of its various states) that 
Christ assumed voluntarily. According to Thomas, Christ assumed these defects for three 
reasons: 1) soteriological: that he might satisfy for our sin, 2) doctrinal: that he might prove the 
truth of his human nature, and 3) moral: that he might become an example of virtue to us.66 
These reasons also serve as the criteria for determining which specific defects Christ did or did 
not assume.  
                                                
65 Marilyn McCord Adams, What Sort of Human Nature?: Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of Christology 
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1999), 9.  
66 Thomas provides these three reasons in both STh III, q. 14, a. 1 and III, q. 15, a. 1.  
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 Regarding defects of the body, Thomas affirms that Christ assumed a human body that 
reflects humanity’s current state – that is, a body that is passible and mortal. His argument for 
this is summed up in the sed contra of STh III, q. 14, a. 2: “The Apostle says (Rom. 8:3) that God 
sent His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh. Now it is a condition of sinful flesh to be under 
the necessity of dying, and suffering other like passions. Therefore the necessity of suffering 
these defects was in Christ's flesh.”67 Thus, these defects were “necessary” in the sense that 
Christ had to take them on in order to fulfill the purposes of the Incarnation, i.e. to procure the 
salvation of wayward humanity. They were voluntary, however, in the sense that Christ assumed 
them of his own free will. Thus, Christ’s bodily humanity was resolutely like our own; it was 
subject to harm, decay, and death, as these realities were the result of Adam’s sin. Unlike 
Adam’s body, it was not preserved in immortality by a divine dispensation, which suggests that, 
had Christ not died by means of crucifixion, his body would nevertheless have been prone to 
death just like any other human body. Christ did not “contract” these defects simply in virtue of 
his human generation, however, since this only occurs through the inheritance of original sin.68 
Rather, they were voluntarily assumed, because, in the words of John Damascene, “What is 
unassumable is incurable.”69 As Thomas explains, “[S]ince Christ healed the passibility and 
corruptibility of our body by assuming it, He consequently healed all other defects.”70 Thus, 
Christ did not inherit original sin, but he inherited certain bodily defects that were the result of 
Adam’s sin, in order that he might heal them.  
                                                
67 “Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, misit Deus filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati. Sed 
conditio carnis peccati est quod habeat necessitatem moriendi, et sustinendi alias huiusmodi passiones. Ergo talis 
necessitas sustinendi hos defectus fuit in carne Christi.” 
68 STh III, q. 14, a. 3. 
69 Cited in STh III, q. 14, a. 4 obj. 1: “[Q]uod est inassumptibile, est incurabile.” 
70 STh III, q. 14, a. 4 ad 1: “Et ideo, dum Christus curavit passibilitatem et corruptibilitatem corporis nostri per hoc 
quod eam assumpsit, ex consequenti omnes alios defectus curavit.” 
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 Regarding defects of the soul, Thomas’s answer is a bit more complicated. One major 
source of this complication is foreshadowed in his discussion of the Christ’s bodily defects. In a 
reply to an objection, Thomas explains that, while Christ enjoyed the fullness of the beatific 
vision from the moment of his conception,71 the natural relationship between body and soul “in 
Christ was subject to the will of His Godhead, and thereby it came to pass that the beatitude 
remained in the soul, and did not flow into the body; but the flesh suffered what belongs to a 
passible nature.”72 Thus, Christ’s beatific vision, which under normal circumstances would 
redound throughout the body and render it impassible, was partitioned off in the upper powers of 
his soul during his life prior to the resurrection.73 This position of Thomas’s becomes partly 
determinative of which passions he ascribes to Christ’s soul. 
 In addition to bodily defects, Christ likewise assumed defects of soul, including the 
passions.74 Thomas had wrestled with the subject of Christ’s passions in his earlier works, and 
the closest he came to a systematic treatment appears in De Vertiate.75 Unlike in the Summa, 
Thomas includes his analysis of Christ’s passions within his general analysis of the passions, 
under the heading of a single Question. As Mark Jordan observes, Thomas’s discussion of the 
                                                
71 Thomas establishes this claim earlier in STh III, q. 9, a. 2. 
72 STh III, q. 14, a. 1 ad 2: “[H]aec naturalis habitudo in Christo subiacebat voluntati divinitatis ipsius, ex qua factum 
est ut beatitudo remaneret in anima et non derivaretur ad corpus, sed caro pateretur quae conveniunt naturae 
passibili.” 
73 Thomas’s view on this matter was not unique for his time. Many scholastics (including Thomas’s teacher, Albert) 
maintained that Christ enjoyed the beatific vision throughout his earthly life. Contrary to modern expectations, what 
was more controversial in Thomas’s own day (and even in the patristic period) was the view that Christ had a 
passible human soul. Following a trajectory initiated by Hilary of Portiers, the patristic and medieval theologians 
were concerned about the implications of the view that Christ possessed animal passions. Kevin Madigan, in his 
monograph, The Passions of Christ in High-Medieval Thought: An Essay on Christological Development (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) offers a useful survey of medieval thought on this topic, but its polemical aims 
render it less helpful than it might be otherwise. It also suffers from failing to engage with Gondreau’s important 
work (see below), as Madigan himself concedes in the introduction. On Christ’s beatific vision, see also Paul 
Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 441-52. 
74 As Gondreau notes, “Because most studies on human affectivity in the thought of Thomas Aquinas have ignored 
the role of passion in Christ’s humanity, the notion of passion as defect has all but eluded the attention of Thomist 
scholars. Yet, the concept of defect represents a whole other side to passibility that is no less fundamental to the 
issue, and without it one fails to grasp the essence of Thomas’ take on Christ’s human affectivity, as it demarcates 
the proper context in which one examines Christ’s passions,” The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 220.  
75 De Veritate, q. 26, aa. 8-10. 
 20 
passions in De Veritate is unique in that it “tries to combine the Christological and virtue-
centered occasions for discussing [the passions].”76 The structure of the articles follows a 
progression of discussion of the passions in general, to whether passions were in Christ’s soul, 
and finally, to a discussion of Christ as “wayfarer and comprehensor” (viator et comprehensor). 
Yet another dissimilarity from the Summa is that Thomas refrains from enumerating specific 
passions to Christ, but rather focuses his analysis on the compatibility of the passions with his 
human and divine nature.77 
Thomas’s treatment of Christ’s passions in the Summa reflects his most mature and 
systematic treatment of the topic. He begins his analysis by stating that Christ’s passions were in 
him “otherwise than us” in three ways: 1) regarding their object: they did not tend toward what is 
unlawful, 2) regarding their principle: they did not forestall the judgment of reason, and 3) 
regarding their effect: they remained in the sensitive appetite.78 Regarding the latter distinction, 
Thomas deploys the term “propassion” (propassio, a term borrowed from Jerome) to distinguish 
that which remains in the sensitive appetite from “perfect passions” (passio perfecta), which 
dominate reason; these terms thus mark the progression of a passion’s movement in the soul. 
Thomas’s next move is to establish that Christ did, in fact experience sensible pain, since “for 
true bodily pain are required bodily hurt and the sense of hurt.”79 This is important to establish 
from the outset, since, for Thomas, touch is the foundation of all the senses80 and is thus 
foundational in establishing Christ’s human affectivity.81 
                                                
76 Jordan, “Aquinas’s Construction,” 85. 
77 According to Jean-Pierre Torrell, Thomas wrote De Veritate sometime around 1256-1259, placing it roughly 
thirteen to sixteen years before the Tertia Pars. Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 1: The Person and 
His Work, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 328.  
78 STh III, q. 15, a. 4. Recall Thomas’s similar phrasing regarding Adam’s passions in STh I, q. 95, a. 2. 
79 STh III, q. 15, a. 5. 
80 See STh I, q. 91, a. 3.  
81 Gondreau notes, “[T]he physical action or appetitive movement of a passion always entails a bodily modification, 
as the passions are exercised by means of a bodily organ,” The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 221.  
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Thomas then proceeds, in a series of articles, to address specific passions in regard to 
Christ. He affirms that Christ experienced sorrow, fear, wonder, and anger. This particular list of 
passions may seem peculiar at first. Thomas does not claim that these were the only passions in 
Christ, but neither does he explicitly state why only these are addressed in Question 15. 
Moreover, wonder (admiratio) is not included among the “canonical” passions classified in the 
treatise in the Prima Secundae; it is a species of fear.82 He grants that Christ possessed the 
congenial passions (love, desire, joy, and hope) but does not offer an analysis of them, and he 
does not address daring or despair in Christ at all. This neglect may simply reflect Thomas’s 
fidelity to the biblical witness to Christ’s life on earth as attested by the four Gospels. Paul 
Gondreau offers the observation that the selection of and the order in which Thomas treats 
Christ’s passions “observes a strategic plan purposefully designed to offer the most convincing 
rejoinder to those who wish to dispute the reality of such affective occurrences in Jesus’ life,” 
especially those influenced by Hilary of Portiers or by a general Stoic disdain for the passions.83 
Thomas is concerned to demonstrate the fullness of Christ’s humanity, and the concerns of his 
interlocutors dictate the priority in his treatment of Christ’s passions.84  
Concerning Christ’s virtues, Thomas affirms, “since the grace of Christ was most perfect, 
there flowed from it, in consequence, the virtues which perfect the several powers of the soul for 
all the soul’s acts; and thus Christ had all the virtues.”85 Yet, he qualifies this affirmation by 
                                                
82 STh I-II, q. 41, a. 4 ad 4: “Ad quartum dicendum quod non quaelibet admiratio et stupor sunt species timoris, sed 
admiratio quae est de magno malo, et stupor qui est de malo insolito.” On the peculiarity of Thomas’s treatment of 
admiration in Christ, see Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 414-27. 
83 Gondreau, The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 453. 
84 For a thorough exposition of Thomas’s christological and anthropological sources in developing his account of 
Christ’s passions, see Chs. 1 and 2 in Ibid. 
85 STh III, q. 7, a. 2: “Unde, cum gratia Christi fuerit perfectissima, consequens est quod ex ipsa processerint virtutes 
ad perficiendum singulas potentias animae, quantum ad omnes animae actus. Et ita Christus habuit omnes virtutes.” 
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stating that Christ did not possess the theological virtues of faith or hope.86 This reveals another 
implication of Thomas’s position on Christ’s beatific vision. While the beatific vision was 
prevented from affecting the passibility of Christ’s body during his life, it was nevertheless 
manifest in the upper powers of his soul, and, therefore, since he saw God in very essence, Christ 
had no need for these theological virtues.87 While Thomas’s reasoning may strike some 
contemporary readers as counterintuitive, it can at least be recognized that Thomas’s logic 
follows what St. Paul says about these virtues in his epistle to the Corinthians, “For now we see 
in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even 
as I have been fully understood. So faith, hope, love abide, these three; but the greatest of these is 
love” (1 Cor. 13:12-13, RSV). Since Christ’s human soul, through its proximity to and union 
with the Word, saw God “face to face,” as it were, he had already begun to model in some 
respects the experience of glorified humanity after the resurrection. 
 
4. Humanity Transformed: Christ as Viator et Comprehensor 
It is in this qualification of “in some respects” that we can begin to make sense of Thomas’s 
claim that Christ is both viator et comprehensor.88 In some respects, he resembles our humanity 
as viator; in other respects, he resembles our future state of humanity as comprehensor, for 
which we long. The crucial move, for Thomas, is to affirm that Christ voluntarily took on defects 
of humanity’s present, postlapsarian state while at the same time avoiding the effects of original 
sin. This allowed his humanity – a very specific kind of humanity – to operate as the instrument 
                                                
86 STh III, q. 7, a. 3: “Et ideo, excluso quod res divina non sit visa, excluditur ratio fidei. Christus autem in primo 
instanti suae conceptionis plene vidit Deum per essentiam, ut infra patebit. Unde fides in eo esse non potuit,” and 
STh III, q. 7, a. 4: “Christus autem a principio suae conceptionis plene habuit fruitionem divinam, ut infra dicetur.” 
87 See STh III, q. 34, a. 1. 
88 STh III, q. 15, a. 10. 
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of divine power in procuring salvation for the human race. He assumed all of the passions, yet 
conquered the disordered fomes of sin by winning victory over sin itself.  
While some readers may wish for a Christ that knew the experience of sin firsthand, 
Thomas is adamant that Christ’s victory over sin is all the greater due to the fullness of his 
virtue. Yet, Thomas imagines such an objection, and he offers the following reply: 
The spirit gives evidence of fortitude to some extent by resisting that 
concupiscence of the flesh which is opposed to it; yet a greater fortitude of spirit 
is shown, if by its strength the flesh is thoroughly overcome, so as to be incapable 
of lusting against the spirit. And hence this belonged to Christ, whose spirit 
reached the highest degree of fortitude. And although He suffered no internal 
assault on the part of the ‘fomes’ of sin, He sustained an external assault on the 
part of the world and the devil, and won the crown of victory by overcoming 
them.89 
 
Thus, for Thomas, Christ’s exemplarity is not accomplished by taking on all defects of our 
humanity (including sin) and then showing us how to “cope” with them or rise above them. 
Rather, Christ is exemplar in that he both shows us the final end toward which are striving and 
also provides, in himself, the means of making our salvation possible.90 In being both viator et 
comprehensor, he moves us onward in our present state of viator towards being comprehensor.91 
The First Adam’s perfection in virtue provided a kind of exemplarity, but it is only Christ who 
                                                
89 STh III, q. 15, a. 2 ad 3: “[F]ortitudo spiritus aliqualis ostenditur ex hoc quod resistit concupiscentiae carnis sibi 
contrariantis, sed maior fortitudo spiritus ostenditur si per eius virtutem totaliter comprimatur, ne contra spiritum 
concupiscere possit. Et ideo hoc competebat Christo, cuius spiritus summum gradum fortitudinis attigerat. Et licet 
non sustinuerit impugnationem interiorem ex parte fomitis, sustinuit tamen exteriorem impugnationem ex parte 
mundi et Diaboli, quos superando victoriae coronam promeruit.” 
90 Jean-Pierre Torrell explores the important distinction between ‘moral exemplarity’ and ‘ontological exemplarity’ 
in Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Bernhard Blankenhorn, O.P. (Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2011), 110-125. Similarly, Joseph Wawrykow argues that for Thomas, Jesus is the 
ultimate moral exemplar and that the notions of virtue and human flourishing are themselves shaped by conformity 
to Jesus and the reception of the Jesus’ virtues and gifts in “Jesus in the Moral Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Winter 2012): 13-33.  
91 Adams describes the connection between the Incarnation and our own beatitude: “For Aquinas […], Christ as 
prototype and head pioneers human excellence – both natural and supernatural – by exemplifying it, to a large extent 
even during his earthly career. If union with God is the human end, Christ’s human nature enjoys if from its 
beginning by virtue of the Incarnation,” What Sort of Human Nature?, 52. 
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shows us the fullness of humanity – including the full range of human passions – in its 
perfection.92  
 Thus, Christ’s pre-resurrection humanity serves as a kind of bridge between fallen 
humanity and humanity in the glorified state, yet it is not as if it were “a little bit of both”; 
Thomas wants to affirm that Christ exhibited the fullness of both. Christ took on all of 
humanity’s passions, but in the process of this assumption, he healed the disordering that had 
been brought about through the sin of the First Adam. In his earlier work, De Veritate, Thomas 
writes, 
“In Christ there was no mingling of joy and pain. For joy was in His higher reason 
viewed under the aspect of its being the principle of its own act, for it was in this 
way that it enjoyed the possession of God. Pain, however, was not in it except in 
so far as the injuring of the body touched it as the act of the body through the 
essence in which it was rooted, yet in such a way that the act of higher reason was 
in no wise hampered. Thus there was pure joy and likewise pure pain, and both in 
the highest degree.”93   
 
Thomas maintained this position throughout his writing career, and it reflects a desire to 
accommodate the fullness of Christ’s humanity and divinity. Equally important, however, is 
Thomas’s desire to put Christ forward as the icon of humanity perfected, the fullness of virtue 
and holiness. In doing so, he also maps out the overarching telos of human affectivity, as it 
works in harmony with reason and ultimately finds its fulfillment in the impassibility that comes 
from resting in God in the beatific vision. 
                                                
92 As Gondreau explains, “Aquinas secures as much inspiration from the affective occurrences surrounding Jesus’ 
own life in the development of his teaching on the integral role of passion in the exercise of virtue as he takes from 
Aristotle’s writings (though, of course, Aristotle has considerably more to say on the subject). That the sinless and 
supremely virtuous Christ should himself be subject to movements of passion makes therefore a decided impact on 
Aquinas, a fact that should not be abstracted from the Dominican’s conviction that virtue (or holiness) and passion 
are not inherent adversaries, or from Thomas’ consequential remark that ‘the moral virtues… cannot be without the 
passions.’ In short, for St. Thomas (as for Augustine), Christ, in his human passions, fully discloses the truth of 
human affectivity,” The Passions of Christ’s Soul, 320. 
93 De Ver, q. 26, a. 10 ad 6: “[I]n Christo nulla permixtio facta est gaudii et doloris. Nam gaudium fuit in superiori 
ratione ex illa parte qua est principium sui actus: sic enim Deo fruebatur; dolor vero non erat in ipsa nisi secundum 
quod laesio corporis attingebat eam ut actum corporis mediante essentia in qua radicatur, ita tamen quod actus 
rationis superioris nullatenus impediebatur: et sic erat et purum gaudium et purus dolor; et sic utrumque in summo.” 
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 The telos of humanity affectivity, as it participates in the moral life and ultimately 
conforms to the exemplarity of Christ’s own affectivity, is most clearly drawn when situated 
within the context of our present humanity and bookended by the First and Second Adam. The 
final picture Thomas provides is represented in the following:   
 
 First Adam Present 
Humanity 
Christ 
Passions: love love love 
 hatred hatred hatred 
 desire  desire  desire 
 aversion aversion aversion 
 joy joy joy 
 sadness sadness sadness 
 hope hope hope  
 despair despair despair* 
 daring daring daring* 
 fear fear fear 
 anger anger anger 
Virtues: faith (faith) faith 
 hope (hope) hope 
 charity (charity) charity 
 [cardinal 
virtues] 
[cardinal 
virtues] 
[cardinal 
virtues] 
( ) =  those in the state of grace  * = not specifically attributed to Christ by Thomas 
 
 
Even in the Prima Pars, Thomas had already begun to gesture towards this trajectory. He writes, 
for example, “In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with 
an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul 
and body.”94 Elsewhere, Thomas explains that while Adam was not placed in heaven when he 
                                                
94 STh I, q. 98, a. 2 ad 1: “[H]omo in Paradiso fuisset sicut Angelus per spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, 
vitam animalem quantum ad corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis Angelo, spiritualis effectus et 
secundum animam et secundum corpus. Unde non est similis ratio.” 
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was created, he was destined to transfer there “in the state of his final beatitude.”95 Although 
Thomas does not state it here, the model of this beatified soul and body is the glorified Christ 
himself; and, just as with the First Adam, Christ was not “created” in heaven, but was rather born 
as an Incarnate human being on earth. Yet, even during his life on earth, he was both viator et 
comprehensor.  
 What this reveals for us is our ultimate end in beatitude, yet this revelation also enhances 
our self-understanding as wayfarers. Christ’s own passions are a model for us, and his humanity 
to which they belong enables us to conform to his likeness.96 As Servais Pinckaers writes, 
“Aquinas’s particular interest in the emotions comes from their contribution to moral action and 
to human progress in one’s journey toward God; it relates to the fact that sensation provides 
humans with a primary image and a basic vocabulary in order to express spiritual realities.”97 For 
Thomas, Christ’s beatific vision – limited to the upper powers of the soul – ensured the fullness 
of virtue and right ordering of the passions; it is an absolute given for him that Christ enjoyed the 
beatific vision from the moment of his conception. Whenever the issue arises in discussion, if 
Thomas ever feels the need to defend anything about his position, it is the fact that this beatific 
vision was limited to the upper powers of the soul (i.e. not the fact that Christ had the beatific 
vision). By virtue of its union with the Word, Christ’s humanity (as personal, animate, conjoined 
instrument) possessed the fullness of virtue, such that the fomes of sin were excluded and his 
passions remained “pro-passions.” In other words, what Thomas believes to be potentially 
counterintuitive about his own claim (and thereby in need of an explanation) is why the effects of 
                                                
95 STh I, q. 102, a. 2 ad 1: “[N]on est positus a principio in caelo Empyreo; sed illuc transferendus erat in statu finalis 
beatitudinis.” See also STh I, q. 102, a. 4. 
96 Reinhard Hütter writes, “The acts of the sense appetite are to support and intensify the acts of reason such that the 
embodied intellect advances ever more efficaciously on the road toward the true and the good; the homo viator is 
ever to proceed in order to achieve his or her twofold final end. And because sanctifying grace (by way of the 
infused theological and moral virtues) reaches all the way down to heal and re-order the passions and allow them to 
contribute even more fully to the perfection of the moral act,” in “Body Politics,” 99. 
97 Pinckaers, “Reappropriating Aquinas’s Account,” 277.  
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Christ’s beatific vision did not redound all the way to his body. And the reason to defend this 
particular claim is to allow room for the reality of Christ’s human passions. Moreover, Thomas’s 
logic points us to the reality that it is the glorified Christ who is the template for human existence 
– his glorified soul and body together provide the icon of the true comprehensor.98  
 
Conclusion 
One can imagine a reader of Thomas objecting that the Angelic Doctor is simply caught between 
the tension of wanting to claim, on the one hand, that Christ had to be sinless in order to procure 
our salvation and, on the other, that Christ offers a truly human example of virtue and holiness. 
On this reading, he errs on the side of former at the expense of latter. But when Thomas’s full 
account of the passions is taken into consideration, including the narrative of humanity’s 
changing conditions (during creation, fall, and redemption), we find that Christ is the only human 
example we have of someone who faced the same realities that we face and yet possessed the 
fullness of virtue. Adam possessed the fullness of virtue, but he did confront the realities of a 
fallen world; our present humanity exists under the “law of sin” (the fomes peccati) and, 
additionally, exists in a world tainted by mortality. Christ’s humanity reaches even beyond 
Adam’s by assuming our defects, thus, he is the most perfect human example of virtue as well as 
the means of achieving our final beatitude.  
In some ways, the objection that Christ’s humanity was sufficiently different from our 
own as to preclude him from being a true exemplar reveals more about one’s assumptions 
                                                
98 Thomas’s position on this matter remains controversial, even among Thomists. Even very fine readers of Thomas, 
such Torrell, Gondreau, and Thomas Weinandy take issue with Thomas on this point. I do not have the space to 
reproduce their arguments adequately (let alone engage them in a meaningful way), but I only hope that I have 
gestured toward another way we might be motivated to follow Thomas on this issue. For a careful and systematic 
response to the concerns of Thomas’s detractors that argues on metaphysical grounds, see Thomas Joseph White, 
“The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision,” The Thomist 69 (2005): 497-
534.  
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regarding the nature of virtue and morality than about one’s Christological assumptions. 
Moreover, if one finds Thomas’s account of Christ’s human achievements to be problematic, 
then Adam’s human achievements will be equally problematic. Both Adam and Christ had 
passions that existed in perfect harmony with reason (albeit for different reasons); both had the 
fullness of virtue (albeit in different senses), and the actions of both are considered more 
meritorious than our own.99 Thus, if one finds Thomas’s account of Christ’s exemplarity to be 
problematic without considering what Thomas also says about Adam’s humanity, then perhaps 
the real concern is about the nature of virtue itself. But if this is the problem, then it is the very 
problem I hoped to remedy in this essay. Thomas’s theological anthropology and moral theology 
are not detached from what has been revealed in Christ. As I have endeavored to demonstrate, 
Thomas’s understanding of human affectivity finds it fulfillment in his analysis of Christ’s 
affectivity. If we wish to comprehend the fullness of Thomas’s account of the passions, we 
cannot afford to neglect what was for him the paradigm of restored humanity, namely, Christ 
himself. 
 
                                                
99 See, for example, STh I, q. 95, a. 4. 
 
 
 
 
